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THE FACES OF JUDICIAL NAIVETÉ 
REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING. By Richard A. Posner.1 




Richard Posner is disappointed in his colleagues. 
As the technical complexity of the federal docket continues 
to ratchet upward, judicial competence is losing pace. When it 
comes to factually intricate cases, forget properly resolving 
them—in Posner’s view, judges often have difficulty parsing them. 
This is not terribly surprising. Causes of action today rest on more 
esoteric grounds than ever before: rapidly evolving technologies, 
“exotic” financial instruments, counterintuitive economic 
principles. Even federal judges, who tend toward the highly 
intelligent side, are liable to get confused. The deeper problem, 
and the one that truly motivates Posner’s critique in Reflections 
on Judging, is that judges are exerting little effort to catch up. 
More than that, actually: according to Posner, the issue today is 
not only that social and technological change outpaces judicial 
comprehension. It is that many judges have responded to such 
change by burrowing headfirst into the formalist sand, effectively 
entrenching their own ignorance. The results, in Posner’s view, 
have been disastrous: faux sophistication with a high-handed 
stride—sophistry. 
Posner’s claim is simple and convincing. He argues that 
judges, bewildered by the involution of many cases today, have 
succumbed to a collective reaction-formation. Rather than 
grappling with the reality of factual and technological evolution—
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what Posner calls the growing “external complexity” of law—
judges have fixated on, and unwittingly multiplied, the law’s 
“internal complexity” (pp. 1–17). The latter has two guises, the 
first of which is doctrinal. Whether because judges have failed to 
define abstract legal terms, or just the opposite—because judges 
have tried too hard to define abstract terms, when plain language 
does the job more crisply—Posner suggests that contemporary 
doctrine often operates as an encumbrance rather than a guiding 
light. One example is “proximate cause,” a tortured idea that, for 
Posner, emblematizes the judicial “attempt to reduce a 
heterogeneous body of phenomena to a single term” (p. 65). 
The second guise of internal complexity might be termed 
“stylistic.” Posner vociferously opposes legalese, and he despises 
the “hypertrophy” of citations (p. 96). A few years ago, Posner 
published an acerbic “review” of the Bluebook in the Yale Law 
Journal,3 much of which has been woven into Reflections on 
Judging (Chapter 3). But the problem, in Posner’s eyes, reaches 
far beyond citation form. He sees the sprawling catastrophe of the 
Bluebook—591 pages!—as symptomatic of deeper illness. Along 
with other “barnacles of legal formalism,” it reflects an ethic of 
insularity that has seeped into, and overtaken, judicial practice of 
late (p. 104). The barnacles are numerous. Beyond “obsession 
with citation form,” they include “fear of math and science, 
insensitivity to language and culture, [the] mangling of history, 
superfluous footnotes, verbosity, excessive quotation, reader-
unfriendly prose, exaggeration,” and (my favorite, I must say) 
“bluster” (p. 104). 
The alarm of these developments may well be self-evident. 
For good measure, however, Posner elaborates a few reasons why 
we should be disturbed. The first is that the judicial focus on 
internal complexity necessarily diverts attention from its external 
counterpart. Cognitive resources are limited; choices of emphasis 
incur opportunity costs. And in Posner’s estimation, it is often 
more important to work carefully through external complexity—
the actual facts—than it is to spend time hand-wringing over 
doctrinal and stylistic niceties. Another reason to be disturbed: in 
Posner’s view, doctrinal and stylistic niceties are not only 
distracting. They are fatuous, an active hindrance to 
interpretation. The overgrowth of doctrine, the artlessness of 
legal jargon, the winding paragraphs that consist of nothing more 
than string-citations; these and other sources of “internal 
 3. See Richard Posner, The Bluebook Blues, 120 YALE L.J. 850 (2011).  
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complexity” have combined to make judging, in reality a vanilla 
process, seem almost mythical in substance and scope. Obscurity 
has flourished in a realm where transparency ought to reign. 
Posner’s solution is as straightforward as the problem he 
diagnoses: “realism.” A realist judge, on Posner’s account, is one 
who pays keen attention to facts, no matter how confusing they 
are, and who asks, at every turn, what actually happened, what is 
actually at stake. “The realist,” in short, “wants to impose a simple 
style of legal analysis on a sure understanding of the scientific or 
commercial complexities, factual rather than legal, out of which 
cases arise” (p. 4).  
By “simple,” Posner means not just stylistically simple, but 
also analytically simple. For law, he writes, is not the “profound” 
enterprise that we often imagine it to be; in fact, it is “one of the 
simplest professional fields” (p. 354). The reason young judges are 
rare is not that nascent legal minds are fallow compared to older 
legal minds. The opposite may well be true (p. 255). The reason 
young judges are rare is that conceptual dexterity is not equivalent 
to sound judgment. While youth often brims with the former, the 
latter, by nature, can only be honed with experience. In this 
respect, Posner styles his “realism” explicitly in the vintage of 
Holmes’ quip that “law is not logic but experience” (p. 6).4 This 
inspires Posner to criticize formalism and grand academic theory 
with equivalent fervor. He spends an entire chapter putting 
Justice Scalia—the embodiment of judicial formalism—and Akhil 
Amar—the embodiment of intellectual “dreaming”—equally to 
the lash (Chapter 7). 
The upshot is that judges today could stand to ease up on 
professional technique—a major culprit of internal complexity—and 
focus instead on cultivating practical wisdom. A key attribute of 
realist judging, in this vein, is the ability to pare down. For Posner, a 
successful realist opinion is one that begins with complicated facts, 
reconstructs them in crisp, easy-to-understand language, and 
efficiently conveys their legal significance. Posner illustrates this 
point by an amusing show-and-tell. To punctuate Chapter Eight—
the “opinion writing” chapter—he takes the liberty of rewriting 
United States v. Morris, a D.C. Circuit case about the sufficiency of 
evidence to sustain a conviction for cocaine possession.5 The 
 4. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881) (“[t]he life of the 
law has not been logic: it has been experience.”). 
 5. United States v. Morris, 977 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1992).  
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published opinion spans 3,237 words; Posner’s revision, far clearer 
than the original, is slightly north of 600 (pp. 276–86).  
In fact, the connection between realism and clear writing runs 
deeper than first appearances might imply. To readers who “may 
think it puzzling” that Posner emphasizes writing style alongside 
“the ‘scientistic’ approach that [he seems] to be urging on judges,” 
he admonishes, in a lovely little passage: 
There is no inconsistency. For I’m not trying to turn judges into 
scientists communicating in symbols and jargon. I’m urging 
greater judicial recognition of the ever-increasing complexity 
of the factual underpinnings of modern federal litigation. That 
makes good judicial writing more rather than less 
important. . . . Law must come to terms with modernity but will 
remain a humanity, and should (p. 355). 
And in hands deft as Posner’s, I daresay it will. 
II. 
A prevalent theme of Reflections on Judging is the 
importance of simplicity and concision in legal argument. In 
veneration of this ideal, and Posner’s propensity for upholding it, 
I won’t waste time or ink going on about what Reflections on 
Judging gets right. The answer is almost everything, and certainly 
the most important things. The argument is spare and tight, 
weaving nimbly between abstract propositions and concrete 
examples. More than anything, though, what I find remarkable, 
and admirable, about the book is the degree of exasperation that 
Posner allows to simmer below the surface. It never becomes 
pronounced enough to frustrate the book’s conceptual ambitions. 
But the exasperation is also unrelenting. And rightly, for if 
Posner’s account is correct, judges are essentially flying blind, 
indeed, willfully multiplying their own blindness. The urgency of 
this point is hardly a matter of taste or ideological preference. It 
is a matter of professional obligation. Posner’s effort deserves 
unqualified applause. 
All of that in mind, I have two points to make about 
Reflections on Judging: two criticisms, one could say, though the 
term is not precisely apposite. More than anything, the points are 
meant to supplement Posner’s already-deft analysis, not to 
subtract from its accomplishments. 
To begin with, a continual source of ambiguity in Reflections 
on Judging, as in much of Posner’s previous work, is how much 
confidence, and what sort of confidence, judges are supposed to  
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inspire. In one sense, Posner wants to demystify the judicial role. 
He dislikes the symbolic pedestal that judges occupy in our 
society: it obscures what he understands to be the essentially 
human, essentially political character of judicial decisions. Posner 
is well known for holding the view that judging in our legal system 
has an essentially “legislative character,”6 and for his avowed 
commitment to “pragmatic,” which is to say, policy-based and 
consequentialist, reasoning.7 More interesting than the merits of 
this view—a subject of endless debate, to which I have nothing of 
specific insight to add—is how it combines with what else Posner 
says about judging. In Posner’s cosmos, judges are run-of-the-mill 
public servants, pragmatic in both the colloquial and 
philosophical sense, striving to bring about favorable policy 
outcomes. Yet they are also prodigious intellects, virtually 
omniscient—perhaps “clairvoyant” is the better term—about 
what consequences their rulings hold in store. What the Posnerian 
judge lacks in symbolic grandness is well compensated for in 
epistemic grandiosity.8 
Take, for example, Posner’s views on administrative law. He 
sees Chevron deference as a mechanism that judges use, 
essentially at their convenience, to pass the buck on difficult 
questions by indulging the “fiction” that “agencies have 
‘expertise,’” when in fact “their adjudicators are poorly trained, 
horribly overworked, highly politicized, or all of these things at 
once” (p. 86). Later, doubling down on the same point, Posner 
writes that the “strong norm of deference to the decisions of 
administrative agencies,” as it currently operates in administrative 
law, is “the fossil remnant of an era in which . . . progressives had 
boundless faith in the potential of agencies as agents of reform” 
(p. 123). There, Posner cannot agree with the progressives. 
Lamenting the fact that Chevron, as an interpretive framework, 
lumps all agency decisions together, Posner asks, “Must we . . . 
accord equal deference to all administrative decisions? The realist 
judge thinks not. The realist judge thinks that deference is earned, 
not bestowed” (p. 123). 
The swerve back to realism here is intriguing. What is the 
relationship between (1) the proposition that judges should be 
 6. RICHARD POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 15 (2008). 
 7. See id., ch. 9. For an excellent reconstruction and critique of Posner’s 
“pragmatist” commitments, see Jeffrey S. Sutton, A Review of Richard A. Posner, How 
Judges Think, 108 MICH. L. REV. 859, 864–67 (2010). 
 8. See, e.g., SCOTT SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 331-353 (2011) (describing the immodest 
epistemology on which Posner’s theory of “pragmatic” judging rests).   
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realists, and (2) the “deference is earned” thesis? Truth to tell, I 
see none. To be a realist is not automatically to share Posner’s 
faith in the prowess of judicial intellect. One can easily imagine 
a judge who approaches legal interpretation realistically, in 
Posner’s sense, and also believes that judges should defer to 
agencies in precisely the manner Chevron prescribes. In fact, the 
most compelling variant of the antithesis to Posner’s view—the 
idea that deference is bestowed, not earned—rests precisely on 
realist grounds. The whole point of a critique like Adrian 
Vermuele’s, say, is that realistically, judges have far less facility 
with specialized or technical areas of law than we commonly take 
for granted.9  
The point is not that realism is incompatible with the 
“deference is earned” thesis. Of course the commitments can be 
reconciled. Posner is a walking example of a judge who 
reconciles them. The point is that compatibility, as such, entails 
no deeper relationship. One axis—realism v. formalism—is about 
how judges should approach the cases they are institutionally 
empowered to resolve. The other axis—deference v. non-
deference—is about which cases those are. 
So, on the assumption that Posner’s general call for “realism” 
is well-founded, the question is: What should we realistically 
expect from realist judges? An example of Posner’s own 
fashioning underscores the difficulties of this question. Decrying 
what he calls “judicial insouciance about the real,” Posner invokes 
the well-known case of PGA Tour v. Martin (pp. 78–80).10 The 
question presented in PGA Tour was whether the Americans with 
Disabilities Act required the PGA Tour to permit a handicapped 
golfer, Casey Martin, to compete, despite the Tour’s 
determination that Martin’s use of a golf cart would 
“fundamentally alter” the sport. The Court held for Mr. Martin. 
Of the opinion, Posner had this to say: 
Illustrative of judicial insouciance about the real is the 
Supreme Court’s decision that allowing [Martin to use a golf 
cart] would not “fundamentally alter the nature” of the PGA’s 
tournament competitions, and therefore prohibiting him from 
riding violated the Americans with Disabilities Act. The 
 9. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL 
THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2006) (developing a “second-best” theory of 
administrative law, focusing on the comparative advantage that agencies have over courts, 
rather than the absolute competency of courts). See also Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian 
Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095 (2009). 
 10. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001).  
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Court’s opinions arbitrarily distinguished, without misgivings, 
between “essential” and “inessential” rules of golf 
tournaments. Yet how could such a determination be thought 
within judicial competence? (p. 80). 
In a sense, Posner is right: the inquiry of what makes for an 
“essential” rule of golf does exemplify “judicial insouciance.” But 
as far as Posner’s broader point is concerned, the example seems 
misaimed by 180 degrees. For Posner, the observation of “judicial 
insouciance” invites the inference that insouciance ought to be 
overcome—if judges don’t understand how golf works, they 
should learn. But another inference is possible and, in my view, 
more natural. From the observation of “judicial insouciance,” one 
could more simply conclude that the relevant subject matter is ill-
suited for judges. Posner may be right, in other words, that 
determinations of “essential” versus “inessential” rules of golf fall 
beyond “judicial competence.” But perhaps this speaks to the 
boundaries of judicial competence, not to the importance of 
having judges wise up about golf. One imagines that Justice Scalia, 
who dissented in PGA Tour v. Martin largely on the basis of how 
silly he found the “essential features of golf” inquiry,11 would 
wholeheartedly agree with Posner’s lament about “judicial 
insouscience.” For Scalia, however, the obvious next step would 
be deference to the PGA’s determination—just the opposite of 
Posner’s call-to-judicial-arms.12 
Posner, to his credit, is aware of this indeterminacy. After 
thoroughly expounding the view that judges ought to learn more 
about fields they do not understand—like golf—he back-pedals 
somewhat, acknowledging that some questions do, in fact, fall 
beyond the scope of judicial competence. In Posner’s words: 
Responsible realist judges who acknowledge and embrace a 
legislative function for the judiciary will confine its exercise to 
areas not only in which formalist methods fall short, but which 
judges understand. They must avoid the temptation to legislate 
from the bench in a field about which they know little, whether 
the field is gun control, legislative apportionment, the 
administration of public schools, or public finance. These are 
examples of areas in which a dose of “judicial self-restraint” 
would be salutary (pp. 122–23). 
A sensible caveat. My purpose is not to fault Posner for 
conceding the limits of his position—very much to the contrary. 
 11. Id. at 699–703 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 12. Id. at 704.  
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But the question is what it means, in practice, for realist judges to 
be “responsible.” How are we supposed to distinguish between 
domains in which judicial ignorance ought to be overcome, and 
domains in which the same ignorance militates, instead, in favor 
of “judicial self-restraint”? In other words: where did Posner 
come up with this list? Is it supposed to be self-evident that gun 
control is a field about which judges “know little,” while “complex 
financ[e]”—to take an example of Posner’s own (p. 72)—is a field 
that judges should strive to educate themselves about? The point, 
of course, is not that it is impossible to distinguish between gun 
control and financial engineering, or, more broadly, between 
domains that are conducive to judicial expertise and those that are 
not. Clearly the distinction can be drawn. In fact, it seems like an 
appealing distinction. In some domains, judges should take care 
to learn all they can; in other settings, judges are wiser to stay 
away. But when it comes to navigating the distinction in practice, 
the final chord of Reflections on Judging is disappointingly faint. 
Posner concludes in equipoise. 
III. 
All of this is easy enough to forgive. Or better yet, no 
forgiveness is necessary. Posner has taken up a far-reaching 
problem—to call his solution partial hardly undermines the effort. 
It just means that more work lies in store. Books, after all, are 
finite artifacts. And if the problem has been well posed, that, 
surely, is forward intellectual motion unto itself. 
I am not sure, however, that Posner has the problem quite 
right—at least, not exhaustively right. I agree with Posner that 
insofar as judges are disavowing the existence of external 
complexity, and erecting artificial forms of internal complexity in 
its stead, adjudication suffers. Miscomprehension of facts, Posner 
rightly points out, “retards” the enterprise of legal interpretation 
(p. 8). I fear, however, that while Posner bangs the realist war-
drum, an important distinction gets lost amid the clamor. It is one 
thing to argue that factual comprehension is a necessary predicate 
of legal interpretation. That seems virtually undeniable. If one 
does not understand what happened, it is impossible to make legal 
sense—or, really, any sense—of what it was that happened. Yet it 
is quite another thing to claim that deeper familiarity with social 
and technology complexity tends to inspire better interpretation. 
This claim is normative, not just descriptive, in character. If we 
imagine “judging” as a function—facts go in, holdings come out—
Posner wants to argue that judges immersed in contemporary  
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technology have greater purchase not only on the factual inputs 
of the function, but also on the function itself. 
I do not resist this normative move full-stop. But it merits 
qualification. Sometimes—certainly not in all circumstances, but 
sometimes—it seems to me that what makes for sound 
interpretation is not comfort and familiarity with the object being 
interpreted, but critical distance from the object. Call it the 
“wisdom of alienation.” It is far from self-evident that judicial 
alienation from contemporary technology is, in every measure, a 
bad thing. If the judicial role is, as I think it ought to be, partially 
about helping to ensure that we live up to our own commitments 
as a polity, a healthy dose of alienation may be just the ticket. 
A pair of concrete examples will help to shore up the point. 
Consider, first of all, United States v. Seiver, a Seventh Circuit case 
that Posner takes to exemplify the perils of judicial estrangement 
from technology (pp. 91–92).13 Seiver concerned the scope of 
probable cause when evidence has become “stale.” After 
determining that the defendant had uploaded child pornography 
seven months prior, the police sought—and obtained—a warrant 
to search his computer. The search yielded a cache of child 
pornography, and the defendant was convicted of possessing child 
pornography and sexually exploiting a child. On appeal, the 
defendant argued that no probable cause existed for the warrant, 
because it was unreasonable “to believe that seven months after 
he had uploaded child pornography there would still be evidence 
of the crime on his computer.”14 The state conceded the 
defendant’s threshold argument—agreeing that the upload was 
“stale” evidence—but it maintained that probable cause existed 
anyway, because a single upload of child pornography reasonably 
leads to the inference that the suspect is a “collector.” The state’s 
position, in other words, was that even if the seven month time 
lapse extinguished probable cause with respect to the uploaded 
video, there was still probable cause to search for other child 
pornography.15 
In Posner’s view, the state’s position in Seiver (as well as the 
defendant’s view) “reflect[ed] a misunderstanding of computer 
technology.” As Posner explained: 
When you delete a computer file it goes into a ‘trash’ folder; 
and when you ‘empty’ the folder . . . the contents, including the 
 13. United States v. Seiver, 692 F.3d 774 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 14. Id. at 775. 
 15. Id.  
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deleted file in question, disappear. But the files in the trash 
folder have not left the computer. They have just been placed 
in a part of the computer’s hard drive that you can’t [easily] 
access . . . [but] [c]omputer experts employed by the FBI and 
other law enforcement agencies can easily recover a deleted 
file unless it has been overwritten [which is rare.] ‘Staleness’ is 
relevant to probable cause when the object searched for is 
perishable or consumable, like cocaine, but not when it is a 
computer file (p. 92). 
Seiver elegantly illustrates Posner’s point. Before one 
understands the ontology of computer files, it may seem intuitive 
for the “staleness” doctrine to apply to them (I confess it did for 
me!). But once technological enlightenment dawns, it becomes 
clear that the “staleness” doctrine applies, if at all, awkwardly, 
and probably not at all. 
No disagreement so far. What I want to stress, however, is 
that Seiver encapsulates Posner’s view so easily because 
widespread agreement exists about the purpose behind the 
“staleness” doctrine. The situation would be quite different if 
“staleness” represented a point of significant normative dispute. 
To see why, consider another technologically imbued Fourth 
Amendment case: United States v. Warshak, in which the Sixth 
Circuit addressed whether criminal suspects enjoy a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the content of their email, even when 
that email is stored on, and has thus been “disclosed to,” third-
party ISP providers.16 Presenting this question, Warshak touched 
a constitutional nerve: it asked, in essence, whether the “third-
party doctrine,” a longstanding fixture of Fourth Amendment 
law, could survive the digital age.17 
Doctrinally, Warshak resolved into two warring analogies: Is 
email storage more like sending a letter through the postal service 
or more like disclosing information about one’s finances to a 
bank? If email storage is like sending a letter, a suspect’s 
expectation of privacy should stay intact. The government cannot 
seize mail with impunity simply because the sender has turned it 
 16. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 17. This question has preoccupied recent scholarly writing on the Fourth 
Amendment as well. See United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 957 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (“[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”). 
Compare Stephen E. Henderson, The Timely Demise of the Fourth Amendment Third-
Party Doctrine, 96 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 39 (2011), with Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the 
Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561 (2009). The question has also come to the 
attention of the Supreme Court.  
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over to a courier service; that holding is among the Fourth 
Amendment’s foundational cases.18 If, on the other hand, email 
storage is like disclosing financial information to a bank, the 
decision to keep email stored on an ISP server would vitiate a 
suspect’s expectation of privacy in its content. Individuals have 
the choice, the logic goes, to maintain a bank account, and by so 
choosing, they lose Fourth Amendment protection over 
“revealed” financial information.19 Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit 
favored the postal service analogy, a determination supported by, 
among other things, “common sense,” common sense that the 
court thought would be “def[ied]” if “emails [carried] lesser 
Fourth Amendment protection [than traditional mail].”20 
Common sense is one thing; inattention to technological 
reality, quite another. A serious problem freights the Sixth 
Circuit’s opinion: although it refers, in one swoop, to a 
defendant’s “reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of 
emails that are stored with, or sent or received through, a 
commercial ISP,”21 there is an important difference between 
sending an email and storing an email. In one case, the ISP plays 
a courier role; it serves as “the intermediary that makes email 
communication possible,”22 just like the postal service serves as 
the intermediary that makes traditional mail possible. When 
email is stored, however, the ISP’s role changes. No longer a 
courier, it serves a function much more like a bank: one less about 
communication with other people, more about allowing users to 
keep track of their own affairs; and also one that depends, just like 
bank records, on users’ “voluntarily convey[ed]” information.23 
Indulging some poetic license, imagine what Posner, donning 
his realist cap, might have to say about the technological 
ambiguity in Warshak. I am not trying to imply that Posner 
necessarily would say this—only that it would be perfectly in 
keeping with the logic and rhetorical pattern of his broader 
argument: 
Warshak is a good example of what happens when judges 
fumble over computer technology. What the Warshak court 
 18. See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877). 
 19. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“The depositor takes the risk, 
in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to 
the Government.”). 
 20. Warshak, 631 F.3d at 285–86. 
 21. Id. at 288 (emphasis added). 
 22. Id. at 286. 
 23. Id. at 288.  
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neglected to consider—because it did not really understand 
how ISPs work—is that users have the choice to store email on 
servers, and the typical user agreement, including the one in 
this case, authorizes ISPs to access stored email at their 
discretion. Therefore, by availing himself of email storage 
service, a user opens himself to the risk that the holders of his 
stored information will disclose it to police; just like someone 
who takes advantage of banking services opens himself to the 
risk that the bank will disclose account information to the 
police. The court in Warshak makes much ado about “the 
prominent role that email has assumed in modern 
communication.” True enough, but this can’t be the feature of 
email that carries the day. Storing money in a bank also plays a 
“prominent role” in modern financial practice. But that does 
not change its status under the Fourth Amendment. 
My point is not that the Sixth Circuit got the Fourth 
Amendment question wrong. To the contrary, like many 
commentators, I regard United States v. Warshak as a lodestar of 
constitutional privacy in the internet age.24 The point is that 
Warshak differs in kind from Posner’s keystone example, United 
States v. Seiver, despite their common foundation in the Fourth 
Amendment. In Seiver, the relevant legal principle was the 
subject of little to no controversy. Reasonable minds agree about 
why the “staleness” doctrine exists—to ensure that evidence 
procured in the past furnishes a basis for individualized suspicion 
in the present—and the question was when, as a matter of fact, 
computer files go “stale.” In Warshak, by contrast, observers 
disagree intensely about how the relevant legal principle—the 
third-party doctrine—should operate, and in some instances, 
whether it should even exist.25 Approaching Warshak from a 
purely doctrinal perspective yields two colorable analogies, and 
the case seems a close question of Fourth Amendment law. But 
approach Warshak from a more sharply normative vantage 
point, and suddenly the case no longer seems all that close. It 
starts to seem more like a paradigm case of what the Fourth 
 24. See, e.g., Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: 
A Question of Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681, 700–01 (2011) (using Warshak as an 
example of the way the third-party doctrine could “short cut” Fourth Amendment values); 
Nicole Friess, When Rummaging Goes Digital: Fourth Amendment Particularity and Stored 
Email Surveillance, 90 NEB. L. REV. 971, 973–76 (2012) (using the Warshak facts as a 
keystone example of the “privacy invasions that result when particularity is lacking in the 
context of [searches of] stored e-mails.”); Daniel Pesciotta, Note, I’m Not Dead Yet: Katz, 
Jones, and the Fourth Amendment in the 21st Century, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 187, 243 
(2012) (lauding the Warshak opinion’s “demonstra[tion] [of] . . . why third-party doctrine 
fails to frustrate citizens’ reasonable expectation of privacy in their e-mail.”). 
 25. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 17.  
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Amendment, updated for the 21st century, ought to protect—
like an invitation to transform doctrine, rather than following 
carefully in its tread. 
I take it as axiomatic that we would prefer a legal order in 
which judges are inclined toward this sort of “critical turn”—the 
crying-foul exemplified in Warshak—than a legal order in which 
that inclination has vanished. This is an axiom not because I 
expect all readers to agree (though I hope many do), but because 
I am not embarking on a full justification here. I will settle, 
instead, for the conditional claim. If we think that it is important 
for judges, especially federal judges, to play skeptic in the face of 
social and technological changes, especially when those changes 
rework the basic interface between state power and individual 
liberty, it can be valuable for judges to have distance from the 
immediacy of the social world. Where a layperson might acclimate 
effortlessly to social and technological evolution, it seems to me 
that we want, and should be able to expect, a greater threshold of 
reluctance from judges. Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit judges in 
Warshak did not appear very well versed in the intricacies of 
commercial ISP providers. In truth, they did not even seem all that 
familiar with how email works. But the result of this unfamiliarity 
was not paralysis or poor judgment. It was well-founded dismay. 
Factual naiveté coalesced with constitutional wisdom. 
Here, Posner could reasonably object that nothing in my 
account actually disrupts his position. Is there any real tension, 
one might ask, between the call for judges to become familiar 
enough with existing technology to perform coherent legal 
analysis, and the idea that judicial skepticism in the face of 
changing technology can serve important normative ends? In 
theory, I suppose the answer is no: the two claims are not 
analytically irreconcilable. One can imagine a judge who is at once 
attuned to the realities of technological change and sensitive to 
the disquiet that new technology can, and often should, inspire. 
Perhaps Posner himself is such a judge. On the margins, however, 
I remain dubious that the boundary between familiarity and 
desensitization can be so readily navigated. 
The danger of poor navigation is a stark one. It is the danger 
of technocratic competency overshadowing normative 
judgment—a live danger in a world where repression often steps 
softly, buttressed by little fanfare but copious memoranda. Little 
wonder that legal skepticism in the face of technological change 
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often adopts an overt vocabulary of totalitarianism.26 We worry, 
and rightly, about the ease with which the abuses of today 
metamorphose into the norms of tomorrow. Ultimately, the point 
is not that realism should be rejected, just that it cannot fully 
account for what is worthwhile about the judicial role. Judges 
should be familiar with social and technological reality, just not 
too familiar. If realism is a judicial virtue, so is discomfort. And 
should the two ever come to clash, I have little doubt about which 
ought to prevail. 
 26. In the Fourth Amendment setting, see, for example, Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 
735, 740 n.5 (1979) (comparing the deterioration of the Fourth Amendment to the onset 
of “totalitarian” conditions); Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of 
Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1084 (2002) (arguing that “[t]he 
increasing amount of personal information flowing to the government poses significant 
problems . . . [and could] result in the slow creep toward a totalitarian state.”); cf. Jed 
Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 104 (2008) (using the “totalitarian” 
specter of “the ubiquitous deployment of secret police spies” as a plea for retooling the 
conceptual foundations of Fourth Amendment law). For examples in the Fifth 
Amendment setting, see, for example, William Federspiel, 1984 Arrives: Thought(crime), 
Technology, and the Constitution, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 865, 900 (2008) (“Orwell 
may have missed the mark by a few decades, but the technology that he feared would lead 
to unbreakable totalitarian society is now visible on the horizon.”).  
 
